(Report assembled for the Workshop of the AMIA Working Group on Formal Biomedical Knowledge Representation in connection with AMIA Symposium, Washington DC, 2005.) Best practices in ontology building for biomedicine have been frequently discussed in recent years. However there is a range of seemingly disparate views represented by experts in the field. These views not only reflect the different uses to which ontologies are put, but also the experiences and disciplinary background of these experts themselves. We asked six questions related (...) to biomedical ontologies to what we believe is a representative sample of ontologists in the biomedical field and came to a number conclusions which we believe can help provide an insight into the practical problems which ontology builders face today. (shrink)

I examine social capital’s impact on financial reports. Based on the social capital literature, I predict that the quality of the financial reports is higher when a firm is headquartered in a region with high social capital. Consistent with this prediction, I find that the firms that are headquartered in this type of region in the USA have a lower probability of committing fraud by misrepresenting financial information. Further, I find that the firms in regions with high social capital have (...) lower levels of discretionary accruals and much more readable annual reports. (shrink)

The sixteenth-century Marathi poet-saint Eknāth is better known for his devotional songs and allegorical drama-poems than his “philosophical” writings. These writings include commentaries on and distillations of Sanskrit texts that feature a highly localized form of Advaita, or non-dualist Vedānta. Rather than consider them vernacular translations of the classical traditions of Advaita, I propose to read Eknāth’s philosophical works as embedded in a local context of non-dualist thought that filtered into the elite world of Sanskrit knowledge-systems. I provide examples from (...) his Marathi commentary on the Sanskrit Hastāmalaka Stotra, a brief versified teaching on Advaita Vedānta. I also look at the para-textual material bracketing the content and some of the accompanying manuscript record, in order to understand the context for circulation and transmission of this material among Eknāth’s various readers over generations. My general attempt is to understand how ideas and practices belonging to local, vernacular networks filter into elite Sanskrit systems of knowledge—that is, not just into flexible genres like purāṇa but into disciplines, like Vedānta, that are generally viewed as impervious to the world around them. From my perspective, all knowledge is local, even that articulated in such cosmopolitan languages as Sanskrit. In Eknāth’s vernacular Advaita, we find evidence for a much wider scope for the movement of ideas, one that moves not from top-down but bottom-up. (shrink)

Images are an important source of data and information in the agricultural sciences. The use of image-processing techniques has outstanding implications for the analysis of agricultural operations. Fruit and vegetable classification is one of the major applications that can be utilized in supermarkets to automatically detect the kinds of fruits or vegetables purchased by customers and to determine the appropriate price for the produce. Training on-site is the underlying prerequisite for this type of arrangement, which is generally caused by the (...) users having little or no expert knowledge. We explored various methods used in addressing fruit and vegetable classification and in recognizing fruit disease problems. We surveyed image-processing approaches used for fruit disease detection, segmentation and classification. We also compared the performance of state-of-the-art methods under two scenarios, i.e., fruit and vegetable classification and fruit disease classification. The methods surveyed in this paper are able to distinguish among different kinds of fruits and their diseases that are very alike in color and texture. (shrink)

Analytic Panpsychism has been brought into contact with Indian philosophy primarily through an examination of the Advaita Vedānta tradition and the Yogācāra tradition. In this work I explore the relation between Rāmānuja, the 12th century father of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta tradition, and analytic panpsychism. I argue that Rāmānuja’s philosophy inspires a more world affirming form of cosmopsychism where there are different kinds of reality, rather than one fundamental reality of pure consciousness and an ordinary wrold that is illusory from the (...) perspective of fundamental reality. (shrink)

Modal rationalism includes the thesis that ideal primary positive conceivability entails primary possibility. Modal monism is the thesis that the space of logically possible worlds is coextensive with the space of metaphysically possible worlds. In this paper I explore the relation between the two theses. My aim is to show that the former thesis implies the latter thesis, and that problems with the latter make the former implausible as a complete picture of the epistemology of modality. My argument explores the (...) relation between logical modality and metaphysical modality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy by David J. ChalmersAnand Jayprakash Vaidya (bio)Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy. By David J. Chalmers. New York, NY: W.W Norton & Company, 2022. Pp. xi + 520. Hardcover $22.49, isbn 978-0-393635-80-5.It isn't uncommon to think that virtual worlds, the worlds we engage with in video games, for example, are not real or at least less real than (...) the ordinary world. After all, they are worlds that are created by us, and thus are less real than the world we didn't create, mind-independent reality. However, in Reality+, David Chalmers argues for the thesis that virtual reality is genuine reality.Reality+ is the twenty-first century equivalent of Bertrand Russell's twentieth century The Problems of Philosophy, published 110 years prior. Like Russell, Chalmers' goal is to explain the basic problems of philosophy to a wide audience.The book's twenty-four chapters are organized into seven different parts: virtual worlds, knowledge, reality, real virtual reality, mind, value, and foundations. Each section has about three to four chapters. Having taught the book in an upper-division philosophy of mind course, I would say that the first nine chapters should be read together to get a good sense of the whole project, because they give shape and structure to Chalmers' basic arguments and positions. The following fifteen self-explanatory, self-contained, chapters, are independently engaging, and can be taught separately, as standalone works of philosophy.Chalmers engages in what he terms technophilosophy, which is the combination of (1) asking philosophical questions about technology and (2) using technology to help answer traditional questions of philosophy. He claims that he draws inspiration for the project from Patricia Churchland's 1986 Neurophilosophy, where she does the equivalent of (1) and (2) with neuroscience. Reality+ delivers clear arguments, referencing historical and contemporary philosophical work, while frequently drawing from science fiction, including several outstanding Rick and Morty -style illustrations. The use of science fiction helps to connect students to abstract ideas, while the robustly constructed arguments serve to instruct students on how to go about critically examining the ideas. My students found the book accessible and engaging. I imagine the book [End Page 1] will become even more relevant to successive classes, as the issues Chalmers discusses grow more dominant in the future.Chapter 1, "Is this the real life?", begins by discussing Indian and Chinese philosophy in relation to Greek philosophy with respect to theme of illusion/dreams vs. reality. In all three traditions, one finds discussion of the nature of reality and whether we can know it. Chalmers thinks that each of these traditions helps to formulate the basic questions of his book: the knowledge question, the reality question, and the value question.The knowledge question: can we know whether or not we are living in a virtual world? In part 2, Chalmers argues that we cannot know that we are not living in a virtual world. He does so by defending his own version of Nick Bostrom's simulation argument (2003), which very roughly goes as follows: (1) If there is nothing (technological or otherwise) that would serve to block the creation of a perfect simulation of a humanlike being into existence (what he calls a sim blocker), then most humanlike beings are simulations. (2) if most humanlike beings are simulations, we are probably simulations. So, (3) if there are no sim blockers, we are probably sims.The reality question: are virtual worlds real? He argues that virtual worlds are genuinely real by examining a variety of definitions of what makes something real in chapter 6. I will examine this argument in more detail in the following section.The value question: can you lead a good life in a virtual world? He argues that one can, in parts 5 and 6. He says: "In principle, life in virtual reality can have the same sort of value as life in nonvirtual reality. To be sure, life in virtual reality can be good or bad" (p. 311).As successful as Reality+ is, philosophical counterpoints arose in my mind. In the next section, I present... (shrink)

Modal epistemology has been dominated by a focus on establishing an account either of how we have modal knowledge or how we have justified beliefs about modality. One component of this focus has been that necessity and possibility are basic access points for modal reasoning. For example, knowing that P is necessary plays a role in deducing that P is essential, and knowing that both P and ¬P are possible plays a role in knowing that P is accidental. Chalmers (2002) (...) and Williamson (2007) provide two good examples of contrasting views in modal epistemology that focus on providing an account of modal knowledge where necessity and possibility are basic access points for modal knowledge, and Yablo (1993) provides a good account of how we have justified beliefs about modality. In contrast to this tradition I argue for and outline a modal epistemology based on objectual understanding and essence, rather than knowledge or justification and necessity and possibility. The account employs a non-modal conception of essence and takes objectual understanding of essence, rather than knowledge of essence to be basic in modal reasoning. I begin by articulating Kvanvig’s (2003) account of objectual understanding, on which objectual understanding of Φ is not equivalent to propositional knowledge of Φ. I then argue that an epistemology of essence that uses property variation-in-imagination is better construed as a model that delivers objectual understanding of essence rather than knowledge of essence. I argue that this is so, since the latter and not the former runs into a version of the Meno paradox. I show how this account can be applied to two issues in modal epistemology: the Benacerraf problem for modality, and the architecture of modal knowledge. (shrink)

In this critical discussion, I evaluate David Chalmers’ position on the moral grounding question from his (2022) Reality +. The moral grounding question asks: in virtue of what does an entity x have moral standing? Chalmers argues for the claim that phenomenal consciousness is a necessary condition for moral standing. After a brief introduction to his book, I evaluate his position on the moral grounding question from the perspective of access consciousness as opposed to phenomenal consciousness, as well as the (...) Jain doctrine of non-violence, and the differentiation of creatures in terms of their sense capacities. (shrink)

In this paper I develop a cross-cultural critique of contemporary critical thinking education in the United States, the United Kingdom, and those educational systems that adopt critical thinking education from the standard model used in the US and UK. The cross-cultural critique rests on the idea that contemporary critical thinking textbooks completely ignore contributions from non-western sources, such as those found in the African, Arabic, Buddhist, Jain, Mohist and Nyāya philosophical traditions. The exclusion of these traditions leads to the conclusion (...) that critical thinking educators, by using standard textbooks are implicitly sending the message to their students that there are no important contributions to the study of logic and argumentation that derive from non-western sources. As a case study I offer a sustained analysis of the so-called Hindu Syllogism that derives from the Nyāya School of classical Indian philosophy. I close with a discussion of why contributions from non-western sources, such as the Hindu Syllogism, belong in a Critical Thinking course as opposed to an area studies course, such as Asian Philosophy. (shrink)

We study type-definable subgroups of small index in definable groups, and the structure on the quotient, in first order structures. We raise some conjectures in the case where the ambient structure is o-minimal. The gist is that in this o-minimal case, any definable group G should have a smallest type-definable subgroup of bounded index, and that the quotient, when equipped with the logic topology, should be a compact Lie group of the "right" dimension. I give positive answers to the conjectures (...) in the special cases when G is 1-dimensional, and when G is definably simple. (shrink)

: In this essay I set out the case for why mindfulness meditation should be included in critical thinking education, especially with respect to educating people about how to argue with one another. In 1, I introduce to distinct mind sets, the critical mind and the meditative mind, and show that they are in apparent tension with one another. Then by examining the Delphi Report on Critical Thinking I show how they are not in tension. I close 1 by examining (...) some recent work by Mark Battersby and Jeffery Maynes on expanding out critical thinking education to be inclusive of cognitive science and decision making. I argue that their arguments for expanding critical thinking education ultimately lead to considering the relevance of meditation in critical thinking. In 2, I examine work on critical thinking by Harvey Siegel and Sharon Bailin in order to draw out different conceptions of critical thinking both from a theoretical point of view as well as a pedagogical point of view. In 3, I present criteria for selecting a form of meditation that should be taught in critical thinking courses; I argue that mindfulness meditation deriving from the Buddhist tradition satisfies the relevant criteria. I then present research from contemporary cognitive neuroscience and psychology about the benefits of mindfulness meditation as it relates to the prospects of including it in critical thinking. In 4, I consider a recent study by Noone and Hogan that suggests that mindfulness meditation does not improve a person’s ability to think critically. I argue that while the study is important, there are substantial reasons for thinking that further studies should be done, as the authors themselves conclude. In 5, I move on to the issue of how meditation can be useful for improving performance in one important area of critical thinking: mitigating stereotype threat. My focus here is on examining the hypothesis that stereotype threat effects performance in critical thinking, and that negative impacts from stereotype threat can be mitigated by meditation. In 6, I summarize my argument for including meditation into critical thinking education, and close by discussing three important objections. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a future direction for comparative philosophy on which it enters the space of public philosophy by capitalizing on the fact that it is already cross-cultural, and adding multi-disciplinary research to its proper foundation. This is not a new thesis. Rather, it is an ideological articulation of thought that is already underway in what is sometimes called fusion philosophy, as found in the work of Evan Thompson, Jay Garfield, or Christian Coseru. My articulation begins with a (...) non-exhaustive delineation of distinct types of public-philosophy that are already well known in the public space. One core distinction I draw concerns how the very notion of ‘public philosophy’ can be understood. I distinguish between the philosophy-to-public direction of fit, on which philosophers enter the public space for some public benefit, and the public-to-philosophy direction of fit, on which the public plays a constructive role in guiding philosophers in some important epistemic manner. Because my position engages the issue of whether “philosophy” can truly be found outside of the west, I offer an account of the relation between science, religion, and philosophy with respect to inquiry into the human condition. In doing so I offer an argument against the view that philosophy can only be found in the west based on the difference between a term in a language and what the term picks out. I close with a discussion of how analytic philosophy, comparative philosophy, and experimental philosophy can come together to form one kind of bidirectional public philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper we establish the following theorems. THEOREM A. Let T be a complete first-order theory which is uncountable. Then: (i) I(|T|, T) ≥ ℵ 0 . (ii) If T is not unidimensional, then for any λ ≥ |T|, I (λ, T) ≥ ℵ 0 . THEOREM B. Let T be superstable, not totally transcendental and nonmultidimensional. Let θ(x) be a formula of least R ∞ rank which does not have Morley rank, and let p be any stationary completion (...) of θ which also fails to have Morley rank. Then p is regular and locally modular. (shrink)

This study examines how one student teaching seminar employed collective critical observation and reflection of an experienced high school social studies teacher's pedagogy using a multimedia representation of teaching. Pre-service teachers watched this teacher implement two full class lessons and reflections on teaching about freedom of speech. This study's pre-service social studies teachers exhibited a developing ability, through collective observation, to critically reflect on their individual methodological and philosophical goals, social studies teaching and learning, and professional and curricular visions in (...) relation to their student teaching experiences and future practice. The study's findings offer implications for how pre-service social studies teachers critically reflect on their practice, while also developing knowledge of learners, subject matter, and teaching social studies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Considering CertificationAnand Jayprakash Vaidya (bio)Jewel of Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology: A Complete and Annotated Translation of the Tattva-cintā-maṇi. Volume 1, Perception. Volume 2, Inference. Translated by Stephen Phillips. London: Bloomsbury.I. IntroductionStephen Phillips' Jewel of Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology is a masterful translation and commentary on the books originally written by Gaṅgeśa, the fourteenth-century father of the Navya-Nyāya tradition of Indian philosophy. Jewel is one of (...) the most highly regarded works in Indian epistemology, one that rivals the work of Immanuel Kant in terms of its depth and significance. While J. N. Mohanty (1966) and B. K. Matilal (1968) translated portions of Gaṅgeśa's Jewel, only Phillips (2020) offers a complete translation—one that will serve as the foundation for any future study of Gaṅgeśa. In what follows, I will not be focusing on issues of translation or interpretation pertaining to the text. Rather, I will be engaging Phillips' account of Gaṅgeśa (hereafter Phillips) with the aim of bringing Gaṅgeśa's Jewel into contact with a debate in contemporary epistemology. I believe Gaṅgeśa's distinction between perceptual knowledge and certification has a lot to offer contemporary epistemology.The point of departure for my engagement with Phillips is the debate over internalism and externalism about knowledge.1 One account of the debate is that there is a disagreement over whether the KK principle is true. The KK principle states that when x knows that p, x knows that x knows that p. Internalists hold that knowledge is a wholly internal affair, and thus they accept the KK principle. More specifically, awareness internalists hold that x knows that p only when x is also aware of x's knowledge basis for p. By contrast, access internalists hold a weaker claim: x knows that p only when x can become aware, by reflection, of x's knowledge basis for p. Externalists typically deny some version of the KK principle. On one version of externalism, knowledge is justified true belief + some anti luck condition, and to have a justified true belief is for the belief to be formed on the basis of a reliable belief-forming process whether or not the subject knows anything about the workings of the belief-forming process. Externalists hold [End Page 486] that x can know that p, without having any reflective access to the knowledge basis for p.2 However, some analytic philosophers object to the internalismexternalism debate. In a now classic set of essays, Tyler Burge (1993, 2003) moves around the internalism-externalism debate by drawing a distinction between two types of warrant: entitlement and justification—where entitlement plays an externalist role, and justification plays an internalist role.The internalism-externalism distinction does not exist in Indian epistemology. In Indian epistemology, there is a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic validity. This distinction only superficially resembles the internalism-externalism contrast found in the analytic tradition.3 Just as Indian epistemologists did not draw the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, they also did not draw the distinction between justification being a wholly internal affair versus justification being a wholly external affair.Can the absence of the internalism-externalism debate in classical Indian epistemology be used to draw an alternative map of epistemic relations, one that competes with Burge's distinction between entitlement and justification? Stephen Phillips' (2012) work on Nyāya epistemology in combination with his translation and commentary on Jewel allows for an opportunity to explore this question. In section II, I present Burge's account of the dual warrants of entitlement and justification. In section III, I present Phillips' account of perceptual knowledge and certified knowledge. In section IV, I use both theories to analyze a case of perceptual knowledge. In section V, I turn to a comparative analysis of Burge's and Phillips' views, to open up the issue for further debate and discussion.II. Tyler Burge on Entitlement and JustificationIn his 1993 and 2003 articles Burge offers an alternative way of seeing the internalism-externalism debate about justification. In his 1993 work he distinguishes between justification... (shrink)

In this paper I develop a cross-cultural critique of contemporary critical thinking education in the United States, the United Kingdom, and those educational systems that adopt critical thinking education from the standard model used in the US and UK. The cross-cultural critique rests on the idea that contemporary critical thinking textbooks completely ignore contributions from non-western sources, such as those found in the African, Arabic, Buddhist, Jain, Mohist and Nyāya philosophical traditions. The exclusion of these traditions leads to the conclusion (...) that critical thinking educators, by using standard textbooks are implicitly sending the message to their students that there are no important contributions to the study of logic and argumentation that derive from non-western sources. As a case study I offer a sustained analysis of the so-called Hindu Syllogism that derives from the Nyāya School of classical Indian philosophy. I close with a discussion of why contributions from non-western sources, such as the Hindu Syllogism, belong in a Critical Thinking course as opposed to an area studies course, such as Asian Philosophy. (shrink)

Recent work in philosophical methodology by experimental philosophers has brought to light a certain kind of skepticism about the role of intuitions in a priori philosophical inquiry. In this paper I turn attention away from a priori philosophical inquiry and on to the role of intuition in experimental design. I argue that even if we have reason to be skeptical about the role of intuition in a priori philosophical inquiry, we cannot remove intuition from inquiry altogether, because appeals to intuition (...) are essential for experimental design. (shrink)

In this paper I examine compatibilism and incompatibilism about whether the self can be both a subject and an object in the same awareness at the same time. While this is an old debate that many traditions of philosophy have contributed to, my point of departure is the work of A.C. Mukerji who worked on the possibility of self-awareness by articulating, what he called, the paradox of ego-centricity. I also consider Patañjali, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Arindam Chakrabarti on the debate over (...) compatibilism. First, I present Mukerji’s paradox, then I critically examine Patañjali and Merleau-Ponty’s arguments against incompatibilism. I move on to bring Mukerji’s paradox into contact with Chakrabarti’s arguments in favor of compatibilism. I critically examine Chakrabarti’s arguments in favor of compatibilism and against incompatibilism. While insightful and powerful, I argue that they can be resisted; and should be considered alongside Mukerji’s paradox. I close by offering an argument for compatibilism based on an analogy with particle-wave duality in quantum physics and the relation between conceivability and metaphysical modality. (shrink)

In this paper I present the distinction between perceptual, reflective, and speculative doubt by engaging with the work of early naiyāyikas. I argue that the definition of the causes of doubt offered by Gautama Akṣapāda in the Nyāya-Sūtra, and commented upon by later naiyāyikas leads to a distinction between perceptual and reflective doubt, but not to a notion of speculative doubt. I then move on to critically assess J.N. Mohanty’s comparison of Descartes’s method of doubt with the Nyāya theory of (...) doubt through the lens of Janet Broughton’s work on Descartes’s Method of Doubt. (shrink)

Perceptual disjunctivism is a controversial thesis about perception. One familiar characterization of the thesis maintains that there is no common epistemic kind that is present in both veridical and non-veridical cases of perception. For example, the good case, in which one sees a yellow lemon, and the bad case, in which one hallucinates a yellow lemon, share a specific first-person phenomenology, being indistinguishable from the first-person point of view; however, seeing a yellow lemon and hallucinating a yellow lemon do not, (...) according to the disjunctivist, share a common epistemic kind. There are two types of disjunctivism: epistemological vs. metaphysical. John McDowell, 243–255, 2011, Philosophical Explorations, 16, 259–279, 2013) has articulated, refined, and defended one kind of disjunctivism. Tyler Burge, 1–78, 2005, Philosophical Explorations, 13, 43–80, 2011) has objected to many forms of disjunctivism, arguing that they are all inconsistent with the proximality principle in the vision sciences. PP requires an ability-general kind in common between relevantly similar perceptual states, such as seeing a yellow lemon and hallucinating a yellow lemon, which disjunctivism denies. Against the background of this debate some analytic epistemologists, such as Michael Martin, Alan Millar, 176–198, 2007), Berit Brogaard, 46–73, 2011), Duncan Pritchard, and Heather Logue, 105–133, 2013) remain attracted to some version of disjunctivism. Brogaard and Pritchard each have gone on to articulate and defend a version. Pritchard’s, for example, defends epistemological disjunctivism. Martin, Millar, and Logue, by contrast, have defended the idea that the disjunctivist is right about something, but perhaps not wholly correct about the nature of perception. In what follows, I articulate and defend the view that an interesting kind of disjunctivism is to be found through a reading of the Nyāya School of classical Indian philosophy. I articulate a version of perceptual disjunctivism informed by Nyāya perceptual theory that is not derivable from any single Nyāya philosopher. The view I offer is inspired by work on disjunctivism both in Anglo-analytic philosophy and in Nyāya scholarship, such as by Dasti and Phillips, 535–540, 2010), Ganeri, 541–550, 2010), Dasti, 1–15, 2012), Phillips, Vaidya, 562–585, 2013), and Schiller, 1–18, 2019). Importantly, the causal account I offer is distinct from Grice’s single-factor causal theory of perception by crucially involving a multi-factor causal theory of perception. My work on Nyāya perceptual theory derives primarily from Jaysankar Shaw’s account of Nyāya on the sources of knowledge, which is distinct from Stephen Phillips’ well-known account of Nyāya epistemology. Shaw’s theory has been developed and refined through textual analysis and dialectical engagement with the twentieth century Nyāya Pundit Philosopher, Viśvabandhu Tarkatīrtha. Like other modern Nyāya scholars, such as B. K. Matilal, A. Chakrabarti, 1–8, 2010), M. Chadha, J. Ganeri, and S. Phillips, 104–113, 2001, 2012), J. Shaw’s account shows how Nyāya epistemology is a living and continuing form of Indian philosophy. My goal here is twofold. On the one hand, I articulate multi-factor causal disjunctivism and show how it can be applied to the McDowell-Burge debate over the viability of disjunctivism and naïve realism. On the other hand, I aim to start a cross-cultural epistemological conversation with those that have contributed to the Anglo-analytic debate in anthologies, such as Haddock and Macpherson, Byrne and Logue, and introductions, such as Soteriou. The hope is that a cross-cultural epistemological investigation into disjunctivism will lead to better epistemic theorizing about the nature of perception. (shrink)

The central goal of the _cross-cultural critical thinking movement_ is to change the dominant model of critical thinking pedagogy that is used in the US, UK, and those countries that follow this model. At present the model is centered on an Anglo-American and Euro-Centric model of critical thinking that actively and blatantly ignores contributions to logic and critical thinking education from non-Western sources; more importantly, the model implicitly sends the message to students of critical thinking that _critical thinking_ is a (...) valuable set of skills that derives from what is taken to be Western culture. Cross-cultural critical thinking, by contrast, is centered on a globally inclusive model of critical thinking that presents contributions to critical thinking from a variety of different cultures and traditions. This alternative model aims in part to convey the message that critical thinking is part of the human condition and that understanding it within the human condition is essential to the proper deployment of it in a pluralistic society where there is disagreement over matters of ultimate value. In this paper I offer a presentation and defense of a set of contributions deriving from the Jaina tradition of philosophy that could be presented in a globally sensitive critical thinking course. The central concepts I present and interpret are: non-one-sidedness, the theory of epistemic standpoints, intellectual non-violence, and the theory of seven-fold predication. In each case I focus on the relevance that the concept has for critical thinking education at the introductory level. (shrink)

Let T be a strongly minimal theory with quantifier elimination. We show that the class of existentially closed models of T{“σ is an automorphism”} is an elementary class if and only if T has the definable multiplicity property, as long as T is a finite cover of a strongly minimal theory which does have the definable multiplicity property. We obtain cleaner results working with several automorphisms, and prove: the class of existentially closed models of T{“σi is an automorphism”: i=1,2} is (...) an elementary class if and only if T has the definable multiplicity property. (shrink)

The "space" of Lascar strong types, on some sort and relative to a given complete theory T, is in general not a compact Hausdorff topological space. We have at least three aims in this paper. The first is to show that spaces of Lascar strong types, as well as other related spaces and objects such as the Lascar group Gal L of T, have well-defined Borel cardinalities. The second is to compute the Borel cardinalities of the known examples as well (...) as of some new examples that we give. The third is to explore notions of definable map, embedding, and isomorphism, between these and related quotient objects. We also make some conjectures, the main one being roughly "smooth if and only if trivial". The possibility of a descriptive set-theoretic account of the complexity of spaces of Lascar strong types was touched on in the paper [E. Casanovas, D. Lascar, A. Pillay and M. Ziegler, Galois groups of first order theories, J. Math. Logic1 305–319], where the first example of a "non-G-compact theory" was given. The motivation for writing this paper is partly the discovery of new examples via definable groups, in [A. Conversano and A. Pillay, Connected components of definable groups and o-minimality I, Adv. Math.231 605–623; Connected components of definable groups and o-minimality II, to appear in Ann. Pure Appl. Logic] and the generalizations in [J. Gismatullin and K. Krupiński, On model-theoretic connected components in some group extensions, preprint, arXiv:1201.5221v1]. (shrink)

: Pierre Bayle is the most forthright and systematic early modern proponent of the actual parts doctrine, the period's counterpart to the 'doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts' familiar from current analytic mereology and metaphysics. In this paper I introduce both the actual parts account of the internal structure of matter and the rival system of potential parts. I then identify Bayle as the leading advocate of the actual parts doctrine and examine his arguments for this account.

This dissertation is a historical and critical study of a controversy that raged among all the great figures of Enlightenment natural philosophy. The issue at stake is the structure or internal architecture of matter. One the one hand, an array of a priori arguments seems to show that matter must be fundamentally discrete in its fine structure: it must resolve to metaphysical atoms or monads. On the other hand, an opposing battery of a priori arguments seems to show that it (...) must be fundamentally continuous and altogether without simple first elements. ;The conflict between these rival sets of arguments deeply unsettled natural philosophers of the Enlightenment. Since both incompatible sets of arguments seemed compelling, the clash between them appeared to expose a paradox or antinomy in the new world view pioneered by Galileo and Newton. The new science's account of a fundamentally geometrical Creation, mathematicizable and intelligible to the human inquirer, seemed to be under threat. ;In this dissertation I present a rational reconstruction of the Enlightenment debate that challenges the standard interpretation in the secondary literature. Contra that standard interpretation, I argue that the debate turns crucially on substantive metaphysical theses about the 'filling' or 'stuffing' of matter, not just on theses about its mathematically tractable form or structure. The early moderns were committed to a particular metaphysical doctrine concerning the stuffing of matter and it is this doctrine that lies behind the paradoxes of material composition. Having set out this new metaphysical reading of the Enlightenment debate, I then mobilize it in order to reassess the various early modern responses to the paradoxes of material structure. (shrink)

A theory T is called almost [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL N]0-categorical if for any pure types p1,…,pn there are only finitely many pure types which extend p1 ∪…∪pn. It is shown that if T is an almost [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL N]0-categorical theory with I = 3, then a dense linear ordering is interpretable in T.

Illustrations: Numerous Colour and 15 B/w Illustrations Description: The volumes of the PROJECT OF HISTORY OF SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE IN INDIAN CIVILIZATION aim to discover the central aspects of India's heritage and present them in an interrelated manner. In spite of their unitary look, these volumes recognize the difference between the areas of material civilization and those of ideational culture. The Project is not being executed by a single group of thinkers, methodologically uniform or ideologically identical in their commitments. (...) Rather, contributions are made by different scholars of diverse ideological persuasions and methodological approaches. The Project is marked by what may be called 'methodological pluralism'. In spite of its primarily historical character, this project, both in its conceptualization and execution, has been shaped by scholars drawn from different disciplines. It is the first time that an endeavour of such unique and comprehensive character has been undertaken to study critically a major world civilization. History of art, unlike that of science, is not an accumulation of facts. It comprises concurrences and overlappings cutting across the linearity of time. Based on this premise the essays in this volume delve into the discourse as also forms of creativity in the Indian tradition in terms of both the perennial and the ephemeral aspects of aesthetic experience. The essays form four groups dealing with (a) core concepts which permeate the discourse on aesthetic theories, and having ramifications in many other disciplines and domains; (b) The Rasa theory in the framework of classical philosophical traditions of Vedanta, Mimamsa, Samkhya, and Kashmir Saivism, and (c) the comprehension of the foundational concepts of aesthetic theory, namely, Rasa and Dhvani from the perspectives of Indian thought traditions addressing also music, dance and the visual arts. There is no clear-cut demarcation between the four groups of essays though in their own framework they illustrate a transition from the discourse (sastra) to practice (prayoga) i.e., from theorizing on the nature of aesthetic experience to the process of concretizing it into forms of music, dance, architecture, and painting. The contributions highlight the fact that the history of Indian aesthetic tradition comprises various textual and performing traditions that have flourished in the Indian subcontinent. What we have is not a single history but multiple histories based on various philosophical and methodological approaches adopted by art historians. Some of these histories pertain to the technical details of a given art form, and some with the changes that have occurred in the evolution and development these forms. While some historical accounts focus on the relevant biographical details of the artists, some art histories focus on the social, cultural, political, and even the economic conditions of civilization that determine the nature of an art form. Considering the multi-dimensional and multi-level complexities of Indian civilization and culture, the contributions to this volume have investigated into a number of factors which are directly and indirectly relevant for comprehending the complexities of the Indian aesthetic tradition. (shrink)

We give examples of (i) a simple theory with a formula (with parameters) which does not fork over [Formula: see text] but has [Formula: see text]-measure 0 for every automorphism invariant Keisler measure [Formula: see text] and (ii) a definable group [Formula: see text] in a simple theory such that [Formula: see text] is not definably amenable, i.e. there is no translation invariant Keisler measure on [Formula: see text]. We also discuss paradoxical decompositions both in the setting of discrete groups (...) and of definable groups, and prove some positive results about small theories, including the definable amenability of definable groups. (shrink)

Filozofija umjetnosti u mišljenju Anande Kentisha Coomaraswamyja povezana je tradicionalnom filozofijom. Estetika, u modernom smislu, nema veze s tradicionalnom filozofijom umjetnosti, čiji temeljni princip nije »umjetnik je posebna vrsta čovjeka«, nego »svaki je čovjek posebna vrsta umjetnika«. Coomaraswamy nastoji redefinirati suvremeni pristup umjetnosti. Suvremeni umjetnici ne stvaraju svoja djela u skladu s Vječnim Istinama. Apstraktna umjetnost nije ikonografija transcendentalnih formi nego stvarna slika razjedinjenog uma. U cilju redefiniranja pristupa umjetnosti, temeljni se jezik umjetnosti mora promijeniti; edukatori i kustosi moraju biti (...) odgovorni za poučavanje o istinskoj prirodi umjetnosti; umjetnost ne može biti jednaka estetskom iskustvu; društvo se mora reorganizirati u društvo bazirano na vokaciji, što je analogno Platonovu mišljenju.Philosophy of Art in the thinking of Anande Kentish Coomaraswamy is connected with traditional philosophy. Aesthetics in modern sense has nothing to do with traditional philosophy of art which basic principle is “The artist is not special kind of man” but “Every man is special kind of artist”. Coomaraswamy wants to redefine contemporary approach to art. Contemporary artist does not create in accordance with Eternal Truth.art is not iconography of transcendental forms but real picture of disoriented mentality. In order to redefine approach to art basic language of art must be changed; educators and curators must have responsibility to teach about true nature of art; art can not be equal with esthetic experience; society must be reorganized into one that is based on vocation in analogy with Plato’s thought. (shrink)

Lawyers and the legal system have been much criticized in recent years. Despite popular perceptions, the legal system contains numerous mechanisms and rules designed to ensure fair results. This paper shows how the legal system tries to implement, in commercial transactions, the ethical principles of truthfulness and fairness. The Anglo-American development of Equity Courts is reviewed briefly. Several examples of the Law's enforcement of ethical principles are presented, in four different legal areas: Contracts, Securities, Goods, and Real Estate. The intent (...) here is to present an overview of the problem, with area-specific illustrations, rather than a comprehenisve examination of the cases in just one area. (shrink)

The paper interprets Nietzsche’s description of authentic human person.Based on the works of Nietzsche, commentaries and philosophical interpretationsof various authors, authentic human person evolves into a superman by usingthe principles of discipline and mastery of oneself. His authenticity, however,requires persistence, courage and strength to endure many forms of sufferingsand to overcome alienation brought about by his environment. Otherwise,man would become slave of his desires or alien to his own powers, talents andcapacities. Thus, Nietzsche’s thought of superman is an invitation to (...) overcomeoneself, the self that is influenced by the non-self or factors outside one self. Itis only possible by using the will to power. The will to power of man overcomesthe influences of the world’s modernization and industrialization that alienateshim to his true self, and this true self is best expressed by his will to power. Onthis note, the author suggests that the readers must use their potentials to face up to challenges of this new era. Keywords: Philosophy, language and literature, emergence, authentic human person,philosophy of the superman, authenticity, alienation, morality, descriptivedesign, Philippines. (shrink)